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CALIBRATING THE WEALTH AND HEALTH
OF NATIONS: TRADE, HEALTH, AND FOREIGN
POLICY AFTER THE WTO'S FIRST DECADE

David P. Fidler*

ABSTRACT
One of the most important themes to emerge from the
relationship between trade and health in the first ten year's of the
WTO's existence is the challenge of achieving policy coherence.
This task is a foreign policy challenge for WTO Members, which
requires looking at the relationship between trade and health
against the backdrop of the making and implementing offoreign
policy. Policy coherence has generally become a major concern
for foreign policymakers because post-Cold War trends, such as
accelerating globalization, seriously challenge traditional foreign
policy assumptions, practices, and institutions. Part of this new
context for foreign policy involves the rise of health as a foreign
policy issue. The trade-health relationship in the WTO is embedded,
thus, in a broader range ofpolicy coherency questions affecting all
the governance functions served by foreign policy.
Considered against these broader frameworks, policy
coherence concerning trade and health breaks down into external
and internal contexts. External policy coherency considers the
extent to which States balance their national interests in trade and
health in their anarchical interactions. This balancing analysis
focuses attention on rules of international law, such as WTO
agreements, which States have devised to calibrate their national
interests in trade and health. Internal policy coherency examines
whether States have domestically organized their policymaking to
ensure that both trade and health sectors contribute synergistically
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to the formulation of the national interest. As between external and
internal policy coherency, more effort by States is required
internally; and the article proposes an approach called "trade
epidemiology" tofoster better internalpolicy coherency.
Improvingpolicy coherencyfor trade and health externally and
internally faces, however, significant obstacles, including the
possibility that more pressing foreign policy, trade, and health
problems subordinate the trade-health coherence objective on the
foreign policy agendas of States.

KEYWORDS: policy coherency,foreign policy, public health; World Trade
Organization; World Health Organization

I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY COHERENCY
AFTER TEN YEARS OF TRADE AND HEALTH WITHIN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION

The tenth anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005
served as the occasion for many reflections on the past, present, and future
of the WTO. ' Given the broad impact of the WTO on international
relations in an era characterized by economic globalization, the reflections
on the WTO's first decade ranged across many issues and subject areas.
Many of the reflective analyses on the WTO's first decade did not
expressly consider the relationship between trade and the protection of
human health.2 This relationship has, however, become significant in terms
of the WTO's role in the governance of world politics. The focus of this
Journalrecognizes, for example, the interdependence of trade and health in
the early 21st century. For the inaugural issue of the Journal, this article
focuses lessons learned about on the relationship between trade and health
during the first ten years of the WTO's operations.
* Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law,
Bloomington; Senior Scholar, Center for Law and the Public's Health, Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities; Advisory Board Member, Asian Center for WTO and International Health
Law and Policy. This article is based on an earlier paper entitled "Achieving Coherence in Anarchy:
Foreign Policy, Trade, and Health" presented at a workshop on "Trade and Health: Policy
Coherence for Human Development," Montreal, Canada, Oct. 5, 2005.
1See, e.g., PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2005) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE WTO].
2

1d.
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The relationship between trade and health within the WTO is
multifaceted and has been the topic of often acrimonious controversies. A
few examples provide a sense of the diversity and intensity of the trade and
health debate. Global civil society groups have criticized various WTO
agreements, especially the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)3 and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), 4 for the adverse impact they have, or could have, on
the ability of WTO Members to protect and promote the health of their
populations. Aware of the fierce debates over the WTO's impact on public
health, the WTO and the World Health Organization (WHO) engaged in an
unprecedented joint study of the WTO agreements and public health.
WTO Members have also utilized the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to
resolve cases involving trade-restricting measures justified
on health8
7
6
protective grounds, with US-Gasoline, EC-Hormones, and EC-Asbestos
being (as of this writing9) the most well-known cases involving the trade
and health relationship. Health has also been raised as an issue with respect
to plans to liberalize trade in agricultural products because of concerns10that
such liberalization could damage food security in developing countries.
The range of health-related issues and controversies that have arisen
concerning trade in the last decade demonstrates that health cuts
comprehensively across the WTO agreements. Organizing an analysis of
the past ten years of the health and trade relationship in the WTO proves,
therefore, a daunting undertaking. My approach in this article does not
engage in an agreement-by-agreement or case-by-case analysis of the
manner in which WTO rules handle the overlap in trade and health
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15. 1994, Marrakesh

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,

Annex IC, in WORLD TRADE

ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321-353 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS].
4 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IB, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284-319 (1999)

[hereinafter GATS].
S WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO AGREEMENTS &
PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO AND THE WTO SECRETARIAT (2002) [hereinafter
WTO AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH].
6 Appellate Body Report, United States - Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter US- Gasoline].
Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinacter EC Hormones].
8 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContainingProducts,WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 200 1) [hereinafter EC- Asbestos].

9The preliminary panel report in another important health-related case under the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, EC - Biotech Products, was issued to the
parties to the dispute in February 2006 but had not, at the time of this writing, been issued publicly.
10WTO AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 5, at 125-126 (discussing trade liberalization

and food security).
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objectives. Instead, I look to what many believe has been, is, and will
continue to be the central challenge of this relationship - achieving policy
coherency between trade and health.
A resolution passed by the WHO Executive Board in January 2006
demonstrates the centrality of the policy coherency challenge in the trade
and health relationship. The WHO Executive Board recommended that the
World Health Assembly stress "the need for all relevant ministries,
including those of health, trade, commerce, finance and foreign affairs, to
work together constructively in order to ensure that the interests of trade
and health are appropriately balanced and coordinated[.]"' The Executive
Board recommended that the World Health Assembly urge WHO Members
"to create constructive and interactive relationships across the public and
private sectors for the purpose of generating coherence in their trade and
health policies[.]' 12 In addition, the Executive Board advised the World
Health Assembly to request that the WHO Director-General provide
support to WHO Members in connection with "their efforts to frame13
coherent policies to address the relationship between trade and health"'
and to continue collaborations with other international organizations "in
order to support policy coherence between trade and health sectors at
regional and global levels, including generating
and sharing evidence on
4
the relationship between trade and health[.]"1
The WHO Executive Board's interest in trade and health policy
coherency reflects the deeper importance policy coherency has developed
as an objective over the first decade of the WTO's operations. The WHOWTO joint study on the WTO agreements and public health concluded its
analysis by stressing the need for policy coherence. The WHO and WTO
noted:
There is common ground between health and trade. . . .Yet
concerns have been expressed by some observers that WTO
rules constitute a threat to sound public health policies .... A
constructive way to address such concerns is to view them as
opportunities for finding common ground. Minimizing possible
conflicts between trade and health, and maximizing their mutual
benefits, is an example of policy coherency. The term refers to
efforts to seek synergies between policies in different areas in
support of their common goals - in this case, poverty reduction,
human development and economic growth. . . . [T]his report
"WHO Executive Board, InternationalTrade and Health, WHO Doc. EBI 17.R5, Jan. 25, 2006,
preamble.
1d. 1(4).
1Id. 2(1).
4 Id. 2(3).
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stresses the importance of the goal of coherence between health
and trade policies at the national and international level.15
The growing importance of policy coherence between trade and health
within the WTO raises questions and problems at different levels of policy
formulation and implementation. As the WHO and WTO observed,
"[p]olicy coherence is easy to support in principle but hard to achieve in
practice."' 6 The complexity inherent in creating coherence for trade and
health policies requires looking at specific problems, such as access to
pharmaceuticals and trade in health services, the politics of which have
been controversial, especially from the health perspective. Specific issues
arise, however, within larger contexts that are also important to understand
in contemplating the task of crafting of policy coherence. This article
focuses on policy coherence issues concerning trade and health in
international trade law under the WTO from the broader perspective of
trade and health as converging foreign policy issues.
The task of coordinating trade and health policies is only one example
of coherence questions facing foreign policy generally in many countries.
Changes in international relations, especially since the end of the Cold War,
have forced all countries, even the most powerful, to confront challenges
and problems for which their traditional policy assumptions, practices, and
institutions have proved ill equipped. The policy coherence agenda is, thus,
much larger than both the specific trade and health relationship and the
more general set of contentious "trade and . . ." debates. 17 The article
explains why understanding this larger phenomenon is important in
analyzing policy coherence between trade and health in the international
trade law contained within the WTO.
Part of post-Cold War adjustments foreign policymakers have made
involves the rise of health as a foreign policy issue. The linkage of trade
and health as policy coherency subjects cannot be isolated from the manner
in which health has emerged as an important challenge across the range of
objectives countries pursue with their foreign policies. Health's
contemporary importance to the key areas of foreign policy makes the task
of policy coherence between trade and health more important and more
complicated, especially if the professed objective of the coherency exercise
is human development.
Approaching the policy coherence challenge between trade and health
in the WTO from the general perspective of foreign policy and the specific
Is
6 WTO AGREEMENTS

& PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 5, at 137-138.
1 1d. at 138.
" The "trade and..." debates involved arguments about linkages between international trade law

in the WTO and other policy objectives, including foreign investment, competition law,
environmental protection, labor standards, and human rights.
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perspective of health's rise as a foreign policy concern produces the need to
analyze coherence in two contexts: (1) external policy coherence, which
involves the balancing of the interests of different States in trade and health
through international law and diplomacy; and (2) internalpolicy coherence,
which involves getting trade and health to work together more effectively
in the State's formulation of the national interest. The article explores each
of these aspects of policy coherence, identifies internal policy coherence as
the more difficult and pressing challenge, and sketches a framework for
promoting improved internal policy coherence.
The article's final substantive section briefly reviews obstacles that may
complicate and frustrate the achievement of policy coherence between
trade and health in international trade law. These obstacles arise from
foreign policy generally, health's rise as a foreign policy concern, trade and
health in their own rights, and from trade developments that affect the
pursuit of external and internal policy coherence.
H. COHERENCY AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE CHALLENGE OF
NETWORKED ANARCHY

The effort to focus on coherency with respect to trade and health in the
WTO is but one example of a much larger project underway in government
ministries around the world. This project arises from the need, noted inside
and outside the halls of power, to rethink foreign policy in order to enable
countries to respond more effectively to the challenges they face in 21st
century world politics. In general terms, the impetus to re-invent foreign
policy flows from awareness that post-Cold War geopolitical changes,
technological developments, and the acceleration of globalization render
ineffective foreign policy assumptions, practices, and institutions
developed in a different time for a different set of priorities.
A high profile example, the 9/11 attacks on the United States, illustrates
the changing contexts in which foreign policy must now be made. As the
9/11 Commission argued, the United States foreign policy and national
security communities failed conceptually and institutionally to "connect the
dots" populating the policy landscape that indicated a major terrorist attack
was in the works.' 8 For many reasons, ranging from conceptual myopia to
institutional inertia, the U.S. government had not achieved coherence on
anti-terrorism policy and capabilities before 9/11. Since that horrible day,
U.S. policymaking communities have been struggling to achieve such
policy coherence.

"sNATIONAL

COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/1l

COMMISSION REPORT

(2004).
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A. Three Trends Fostering the Rethinking of Foreign Policy
Reinventing foreign policy confronts three trends that simultaneously
call for, and complicate, coherency approaches. The first trend is the
breakdown between the traditional distinctions between "domestic policy"
and "foreign policy." This trend is familiar to those who work on public
health because it has been a theme in the literature on the globalization of
public health with respect to both communicable and non-communicable
diseases. 19 The trend is not, however, confined to public health, as
confusion in the United States and other countries between "homeland
security" and "national security" makes clear. Increasingly, policy
problems are "global" and
' 20 only with difficulty can they be categorized as
"domestic" or "foreign."
The second trend is for problems to cut across conventionally defined
issue areas, creating the need for "interagency" cooperation and
coordination within governments. 21 Such problems do not respect
traditional jurisdictional boundaries that establish turf for government
ministries. As explored below, the emergence of health as a foreign policy
issue constitutes just such a cross-cutting challenge. More specifically,
concerns about how trade and health policies align also express the need to
adapt vertically "stove piped" ministries to horizontally dynamic problems.
The third trend arises from the convergence of the other two trends. As
"stove piped" government ministries and agencies increasingly have to
manage globalized issues, they begin to interact more directly with their
counterparts in ministries overseas. Such transgovernmentalism produces
what scholars call the disaggregation of State sovereignty. 22 The formation
of transgovernmental networks at ministry level and below undermines the
notion that a unitary State makes and implements policy. Rather,
transgovernmental networks influence how policy is made. Horizontal
plumbing connecting the policy nodes of disaggregated States is replacing
the vertical stove piping of policy in the unitary State.

19Kelley Lee, Suzanne Fustukian & Kent Buse, An Introduction to Global Health Policy, in
HEALTH POLICY IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 3, 3-17 (K. Lee, K. Buse & S. Fustukian eds., 2002).
20 David Held and Anthony McGrew, PoliticalGlobalization: Trends and Choices, in PROVIDING
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 185-199 (1.Kaul, P. Conceiggo, K. Le

Goulven & R. U. Mendoza, eds., 2003).
21

JOSPEH S. NYE & ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, PRINCETON PROJECT ON NAT'L SEC., REPORT OF

THE WORKING GROUP ON FOREIGN POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE AND GLOBAL INSTITUTION (2005),

available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/FPIGI.pdf.
22 ANNE-MARIE

SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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B. Implications of the Three Trends for Policy Coherence
Each trend has important consequences for thinking about policy
coherence. The blurring of the traditional distinction between domestic and
foreign policies actually increases the importance of foreign policy for all
issue areas. The interconnectedness between the local and the global
fostered by globalization produces the need to shift governance of issues
from the local to the national, and from the national to the global. The
essence of foreign policy - organizing a country's relations with other
States and foreign bodies - has increasingly become central to most policy
areas. As a result, coherence in foreign policy has wide ramifications as a
governance matter.
The tendency of globalized problems to affect policy across
traditionally defined issue areas creates not only the need for interagency
efforts but also competition among agencies for how the interagency
agenda should unfold. The question becomes not policy coherence per se
but policy coherence on whose terms. Interagency cooperation and
coordination can trigger darwinistic, survival-of-the-fittest behavior, with
"alpha agencies" protecting their bureaucratic turf and attempting to
expand that turf at the expense of less powerful agencies.
The rise of transgovemmentalism as a policy phenomenon complicates
the State's production of coherent policy. Horizontal policy plumbing
among finance ministers of various countries might achieve coherence
among themselves, but they might fail to connect their pipes with the
plumbing running between development or environment ministries. To
overcome the potential policy incoherence resulting from the formation of
transgovernmental networks, these networks have to be networked
themselves so that a "network of networks" strives for policy coherence.
The complexity of the task of policy coherence in such an approach
perhaps makes interagency cooperation within a single government look
simple by comparison.
C. Policy Coherence in Networked Anarchy
This discussion of the three trends and their implications assumes that
policy coherence is, or should be, a central characteristic of foreign policy
in a globalized world. We should pause to consider this assumption
because it connects to divergent perspectives about the ultimate purpose of
a country's foreign policy. We might agree that policy coherence is
important to a State's foreign policy for the reasons explored above, but
this consensus tells us little about why a particular State might think
coherence is an important national interest. The demand for policy
coherence may have nothing to do with promoting human development
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nationally or globally but everything to do with a State's interests in
security, power, or placating an influential special interest group.
Exploring diverse explanations about the nature of foreign policy is
beyond this article's scope, but a few words are in order because some
elements of the debates about foreign policy are important for thinking
about policy coherence generally and with respect to trade and health in the
WTO. At its most basic, foreign policy represents a State's attempt to
secure its interests in a political environment characterized by anarchy.
Anarchy does not mean chaos. Rather, anarchy describes the fact that
international relations operate in a political context in which the actors
recognize no common, superior authority. 23 The condition of anarchy
affects, however, State behavior, especially foreign policy. Different
theories of international relations offer competing explanations for the
underlying motives of foreign policy behavior.
All leading theories of foreign policy behavior would explain any drive
for policy coherence in terms of larger objectives connected to a country's
concept of its national interests. Policy coherency, in the abstract, does not
motivate States unless it serves some political purpose. States interacting in
a condition of anarchy often have conflicting conceptions of what is
important in their national interests. Country A and Country B may be
pursuing coherency in their respective foreign policies on the same issues
but for reasons that conflict. Each may achieve policy coherency but not
develop a foundation for successful collective action on a particular
problem.
In other words, coherency in one State's foreign policy does not
necessarily produce collective coherency among countries. States compete
to maximize the likelihood that their own conceptions of coherence prevail.
Depending on the configuration of power among States, one could see the
hegemon or a small circle of great powers determine what policy coherency
means. Anarchical politics are rarely representative or democratic.
This dynamic of competition often brings intergovernmental
institutions and mechanisms, including international law, into play. States
use these instruments to coordinate divergent national interests and to
mediate power inequalities in the international system. In these settings,
policy coherency among countries often becomes the search for the lowest
common denominator, or for rhetoric sufficiently broad to allow every
State to claim it obtained what it wanted from the multilateral process. The
outcome of the World Summit at the United Nations in September
24 2005
provides an example of these lowest-common denominator politics.
23Tim

Dunne & Brian C. Schmidt, Realism, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 141, 143 (J. Baylis & S. Smith eds., 2nd ed. 2001).
24UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/60/L. 1, Sept. 20,2005.
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The picture is more sobering when one combines the impact of anarchy
with the effects of globalization. Anarchy pushes countries to decide on
negotiating positions and strategies that represent their national interests.
The mechanics of globalization disaggregate issues and policy responses,
fostering more complex webs of transgovernmental networks that make the
national interest appear kaleidoscopic. From the foreign policy perspective,
coherence has to be pursued in the context of networked anarchy, a
political context that requires unity of purpose implemented through a
diversity of means. Policy coherence in networked anarchy requires the
ability, nationally and globally, to synthesize cross-cutting problems and to
re-wire internal and external networks to produce actions that adequately
address them. This ability indicates that States must have sufficient
governance capacity to undertake these tasks.

m. THE COHERENCY CHALLENGE

OF HEALTH AS FOREIGN POLICY

Exploring the general challenges policy coherence faces in the world of
foreign policy is important to understanding the policy coherency agenda
involving trade and health. The trade and health coherency challenge
highlighted by the first ten years of the WTO's existence should be seen as
only part of the broader enterprise of integrating health into all major
functions of foreign policy. This enterprise emerged in the last decade as
health increasingly became more important to many aspects of countries'
foreign policies. 2 Health's rise as a foreign policy issue enhances and
complicates the objective of producing coherency in trade and health
policies in the WTO.
A. ForeignPolicy's Governance Functions
In simple terms, States undertake four governance functions through
foreign policy. First, States attempt to ensure their security from external
threats. Historically, this function has focused on military threats posed by
rival States. Second, States engage in foreign policy to enhance their
economic power and well-being. Thus, trade and foreign investment
strategies play a significant role in foreign policies. Third, States support
the political and economic development of other countries. Often the
foreign policy concern about development connects to the State's security
or economic interests, but sometimes States undertake development
initiatives for humanitarian reasons. Fourth, States use foreign policy to
promote and protect human dignity, as evidenced by support for human
2' See, e.g., HEALTH, FOREIGN POLICY & SECURITY: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR

RESEARCH AND POLICY (A. Ingram, ed., 2004); David P. Fidler, Health as Foreign Policy:
Between Principleand Power, 6 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT'L REL. 2, 179-194 (2005).
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rights and the provision of humanitarian assistance to countries and
populations.
Historically, these foreign policy functions existed in a hierarchy.
Security and economic power ranked as more important than development
and human dignity. See Figure 1. From the mid-19th century until World
War II, foreign policy's interest in health predominantly concerned
reducing the burden national health measures, such as maritime quarantine,
imposed on international trade and commerce. 26 Since World War II,
health's place in foreign policy mostly related development and human
dignity agendas, the traditional "low politics" of international relations.
FIGURE 1.27

National security

Material interests

High politics

Economic interests

Development

Normative values

r

Human Dignity

Low politics

Even in these agendas, health was not a top priority. The approach of
development policies to health during the Cold War stressed that "wealth
produced health." The argument that investments in health actually
contribute to economic development did not gain serious influence until the
David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New
International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325, 328-33 (2005) (analyzing the
international law and diplomacy concerning control of the international spread of infectious
diseases from 1851 to 1951).
27 DAVID P. FIDLER, HEALTH AND FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 3 (2005).
26
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World Bank published Investing in Heath in 1993. In terms of human
dignity, the bifurcation of human rights into civil and political rights and
29
economic, social, and cultural rights put health into the latter category,
which did not receive as much attention as civil and political rights from
human rights advocacy during the Cold War. Further, WHO's approach to
international health after its establishment in 1948 moved away from the
pre-World War II foreign policy linkage of the health and trade interests of
States and towards achieving universal access to primary health care in the
developing world. 30 This "health for all" strategy was not directly
connected with the specific trade interests of States. The strategy was
linked to trade more generally through its support for the New International
Economic Order, 3 ' which sought to restructure radically all manner of
international economic relations.32
B. Health as Foreign Policy
The rise of health as a foreign policy issue during the last decade
reveals health escaping from its traditional place in the "low politics" of
international relations to a situation in which health has become an
important consideration for each of the governance functions foreign policy
serves. The public health threats posed by biological weapons and
pandemic33 diseases have become national and international security
concerns. The emphasis by both the WTO and WHO on the importance
of trade and health coherency signals the emergence of health as a more
important consideration in international economics, a message reinforced
by other efforts.34 In terms of development, WHO has pointed out that
health is at the heart of the United Nations' Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), 35 which constitute the leading development initiative in the
world today. Rights-based arguments involving health proliferated in the

28WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH (1993).

29See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
UNTS 3 (on the right to the highest attainable standard of health).
30 Declaration of Alma Ata, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Sept. 6-12, 1978,
available
at http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration-almaata.pdf.
31
id.
'2 Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201-3202 (May 1, 1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
33
See, e.g., HEALTH, FOREIGN POLICY & SECURITY: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
RESEARCH
AND POLICY (A. Ingram, ed., 2004).
34
See COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT (2001).
31 World Health Organization, WHO and the Millennium Development Goals, available at

http://www.who.int/mdg/enL.
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36
last decade, including concerns about HIV/AIDS-related discrimination,
ensuring civil and political rights are protected as much as possible when
governments respond to outbreaks of dangerous communicable diseases
(e.g., quarantines used during the SARS outbreak in 2003),38 37 and

increasing access of the poor and vulnerable to essential medicines.

These developments across all the governance functions of foreign
policy forced governments to think about health as foreign policy. Whether
and how health is integrated effectively across the foreign policy functions
have now become important national and international governance

questions. The rise of health as a foreign policy concern exhibits all the
characteristics of networked anarchy analyzed above - the blurring of
traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy, the tendency
of health problems to cut across traditionally defined issue areas, and the
development of transgovernmental and non-governmental networks trying
to address health problems. The idea of health as foreign policy attempts to

capture the challenge of crafting unity of purpose on health challenges
through the diversity of functions served by foreign policy. Health as
foreign policy requires coherence not only within individual foreign policy
functions but also across these functions.
The idea of health as foreign policy does not mean that foreign policies
of different countries are or will be uniform as to whether or how they
integrate health for foreign policy purposes. The health component of
security is more important to the United States because of bioterrorist fears
than it is for many developing countries, which perhaps focus more on
health's role in their development. Developed States may stress their
sovereign right to establish "zero tolerance" levels for health risks
potentially moving in international trade, but this high level of health
protection may adversely affect developing-country exports that cannot
achieve the high level of health protection established. In addition, the
extent to which a State can pursue health as foreign policy depends on its
governance capacities, which raises questions about the governance
capabilities of many developing and least-developed countries.
Thus, health as foreign policy does not escape the effects anarchy has
on States' calculations of their respective national interests. Divergence of
national interests, among States routinely occurs in international relations.
To ameliorate such divergence, a State will often argue that its interests
coincide with what is in the interest of other States and the international
36 LAWRENCE

0. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND UNFULFILLED

(2004).
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS, A
REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2003).
3EXPECTATIONS
7

38

See Medecins sans Frontieres, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, available at

http://www.accessmed-msf.org/.
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community. This "harmony of interests" doctrine has been criticized in
connection with foreign policy behavior generally, 39 and the doctrine is
equally suspect in the context of health and foreign policy.
For example, developed States (and pharmaceutical companies) have
argued that high international standards for protecting pharmaceutical
patents and other forms of intellectual property are good for the world's
health because such protection will stimulate more health-related research
and development. Many developing States and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have met claims that a harmony of interests exists
among States on the need for high levels of patent protection with
skepticism and opposition. This example illustrates that, even within health
as foreign policy, the national interest rather than abstract notions of human
development controls and shapes the political context in which States
pursue policy coherency.
IV. TRADE AND HEALTH AS A COHERENCY CHALLENGE IN FOREIGN
POLICY

Approaching the challenge of policy coherence between trade and
health in the WTO from foreign policy generally and health as foreign
policy specifically produces the need to give coherence more precise
meaning. To understand the challenge properly, we need to comprehend
that coherence can exist at two different levels - the external and the
internal. External coherence refers to policy coherence in the international
realm, in the anarchical space in which States interact. Internal coherence
means policy coherence in the domestic realm, in the hierarchical space in
which countries respectively organize their political affairs. External and
internal coherence are interdependent, but they are sufficiently different
analytically to be discussed as separate aspects of the larger task of policy
coherence.
A. ExternalPolicy Coherency: BalancingState Interestsin Trade and
Health
As argued above, the dynamics of anarchical politics among States
often produces divergent national interests. Some controversy and concern
that have arisen in the trade-health relationship in the WTO flow from a
perceived divergence of national interests on trade and health issues.
Country A wants to increase exports of tobacco products, but Country B
wants to restrict importation of tobacco products in order to protect public
39

EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CIUSIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 75-85 (2nd ed. 1946) (critiquing the harmony of interests doctrine).
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health. Country C wants to increase access to effective medical
technologies by producing them locally, but Country D wants Country C to
respect the patent rights on such medical technologies held by Country D's
nationals. Country E wants to increase its exports of private health
insurance services, but Country F wants to prevent private insurance from
undermining the universal coverage provided by its national health
insurance system.
As with all issues in international relations, the main question when
national interests diverge is how States manage this divergence in their
anarchical relations. In this external policy realm, continued divergence of
national interests will prevent construction of collective approaches that
accommodate differing national interests in sustainable patterns of behavior.
Achieving such accommodations produces external policy coherence when
divergent interests are balanced, meaning that the outcome allows States to
hold and pursue both interests simultaneously.
Balancing trade and health interests has been an objective of both
international law on public health and international trade law well before
the WTO's establishment. Both sets of international legal rules have long
recognized a State's right to restrict trade to protect human health, provided
that the trade-restrictive measure has a rational relationship to protecting
health and does not restrict trade more than is necessary to achieve the
health objective in question.
The old international sanitary conventions of the late 19th and early
20th centuries and WHO's International Health Regulations (originally
adopted in 1951) prohibited the use of trade-restricting measures designed
to prevent the importation of specific communicable diseases unless the
conventions or Regulations specifically authorized the use of such
measures. 40 These agreements contained the maximum health-protectinW
measures that States parties could apply to international trade and travel.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (originally adopted
in 1947) likewise permitted contracting parties to violate GATT obligations
if the violating measures were necessary to protect human health, with
4o Fidler, supranote 26, at 329.

See, e.g., International Sanitary Convention art. 15, June 21, 1926, 2 BEVANS 545 ("The
measures provided for in this Chapter must be regarded as constituting a maximum within the
limits of which Governments may regulate the procedure to be applied to ships on their arrival.");
International Health Regulations art. 23, July 25, 1969, in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (1969) (3rd ann. ed. 1983) ("The health measures
permitted by these Regulations are the maximum measures applicable to international traffic,
which a State may require for the protection of its territory against the diseases subject to the
Regulations.").
42 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(b), Apr. 15. 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
4

LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

423-492 (1999) [hereinafter GATT].
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"necessary" meaning that the measure in question had to be the least
GAT-T-inconsistent (i.e., least trade-restrictive) measure possible to achieve
the health protection sought. 43 This approach, common to both pre-WTO
international law on public health and trade, attempted to establish a
balance between one State's interest in engaging in trade and another
State's interest in protecting the health of its population.
B. External Policy Coherency on Trade and Health and International
Law
Contemporary international law on public health and international trade
law within the WTO continue to attempt to balance trade and health
interests and thus achieve external policy coherency. First, in terms of trade
in goods and health, the key WTO agreements - GATT, the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement)," and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement)45 - recognize the WTO Member's right to restrict trade to
protect human health but apply disciplines to this right to ensure that trade
is not unnecessarily restricted and health is not used to disguise an
unjustified or arbitrary restriction on international trade.
With regard to international law on public health, the same approach of
balancing the right of health protection with preserving as much trade flow
as possible has routinely
appeared from the international sanitary
conventions of the late 19th century to the new International Health
Regulations adopted in 2005 (IHR 2005).46 For example, the IHR 2005's
purpose and scope "are to prevent, protect against, control and provide a
public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that
are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which
avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade." 47 The
stability and continuity of this approach over long periods of time in both
international trade law and international health law suggest that States have

43 Thailand

- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990,
GATT Doc. DSIO/R. GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 59-72 (1999) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].

" Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. r5. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 121-142 (1999)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement].
4World Health Assembly, Revision of the InternationalHealth Regulations, WHA58.3 (May 23,
2005) [hereinafter IHR 2005].
47Id.art. 2.
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settled on a strategy they believe produces sustainable external policy
coherency between trade in goods and health.
Second, in terms of trade in health-related services, the main
multilateral agreement, GATS, imposes few disciplines on WTO Members
seeking to protect health from 4potentially adverse effects created by
imports of health-related services. GATS' general obligations, such as the
most-favored-nation principle,49 are not a serious constraint on the exercise
of sovereignty to protect human health. In terms of specific commitments
under GATS, each WTO Member decides whether it wants to accord
market access or national treatment to the health-related services and
service providers of other WTO Members, subject to whatever exceptions
to such access and treatment the WTO Member desires to retain.
Unlike the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement,5 1 GATS contains
no general obligation to ensure that any trade-restricting health measure is
not more restrictive than necessary to achieve the health objective in
question. This obligation appears is GATS' general exceptions, which
allow WTO Members to violate GATS in implementing a measure that is
necessary to protect human health and that is not applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against trade. 52 The
balance struck for external policy coherency with respect to GATS allows
WTO Members to favor health over trade much more compared to the
agreements on trade in goods.
Third, with respect to intellectual property rights, TRIPS requires WTO
Members to accord baseline patent rights, 53 subject to safeguards and
flexibilities that WTO Members can use for public health purposes.54 This
approach echoes the one taken in trade in goods - the rules allow an
exception to general obligations that can be used for health protection
purposes. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (Doha Declaration) issued at the Doha ministerial meeting in 2001
made clear that nothing in TRIPS should be interpreted to prevent a WTO
Member from taking action to protect health. 55
" See generally DAVID P. FIDLER, CARLOS CORREA & OBUIOFOR AGINAM, LEGAL REVIEW OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS) FROM A HEALTH POLICY PERSPECTIVE

(2005); David P. Fidler, Nick Drager, Carlos Correa & Obijiofor Aginam, Making Commitments in
Health Services under the GATY: Legal Dimensions, in

INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN HEALTH

SERVICES AND THE GATS: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEBATES 141, 141-167 (C. Blouin, N. Drager &
R. Smith eds., 2006).
49 GATS art. II.
Id. arts. XVI, XVII.
' SPS Agreement art. 5.6; TBT Agreement art. 2.2.
52
GATS art. XIV.
" TRIPS arts. 27-28.
SId. at.3 1.
World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://www.wto.orglEnglish/thewtoelminist_e/minOle
/mindecl_tripse.htm [hereinafter Declarationon the TRIPSAgreement and Public Health].
"
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C. Criticism of the Prevailing External Policy Coherency in
International Trade Law
To be sure, many health experts and advocates would argue that
international trade law as developed over the first decade of the WTO's
operations favors trade over health and thus does not achieve the balance
required for external policy coherency. The requirement that traderestricting health measures be necessary - the so-called "necessity test" has been a particular target of health-related criticism of WTO agreements.
According to such critics, a more coherent approach would be to permit all
trade-restricting health measures that had a legitimate basis and were
applied in a non-discriminatory manner. The "necessity test" allows
scientifically justified and non-discriminatory measures to be struck down
to facilitate larger trade flows.
GATS' seemingly more flexible approach to trade in services has also
not been well received in many health policy circles because of fears that
GATS will lead to the privatization of public services, harming efforts to
achieve, for example, universal access to health care.56 Similarly, concerns
have been raised about TRIPS' requirement that all countries provide
baseline patent rights for all pharmaceutical products, subject only to
safeguards and flexibilities that major economic players, particularly the
United States, have challenged and tried to undermine. Many critics of
TRIPS would prefer to leave the decision about what kind of patent rights
recognize the sovereign deliberations of each country, an approach that
would allow each country to accommodate its health concerns more
robustly if it so desired. The Doha Declaration arose from intense
controversy on the meaning and scope of the safeguards and flexibilities
TRIPS contains and does not reflect solidarity in terms of external policy
coherency on the relationship between patent rights and public health.
The common thread in these criticisms is that the WTO rules create an
imbalance rather than a balance because the rules favor trade over health,
and thus do not achieve external policy coherency. The criticisms help
demonstrate, however, that external policy coherency involves balancing
competing national interests. This balancing task does not, and cannot,
strive for calibrating competing interests such that both get equal weight in
all situations. Anarchical politics rarely produce results where everything is
accorded equal weight. Further, rules that gave equal weight to all
competing interests would produce deadlock because such rules provide no
guidance for deciding when one interest should legitimately prevail other
another in case of conflict.

56 Fidler et al., supra note 48, at 143.
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D. External Policy Coherency Scorecard for Trade and Health after
Ten Years of the WTO
1. External Policy Coherency and Trade in Good.- A case can be
made that the existing WTO rules, with the exception of the patent
provisions in TRIPS, adequately balance trade and health interests and thus
achieve external policy coherency. As noted above, the prevailing
international legal rules in the WTO concerning trade in goods and services
construct approaches that permit trade flows and health protection to occur
in a sustainable pattern over time.
Health critics of WTO rules on trade in goods still dislike the potential
that trade interests can trump health concerns and would prefer rules that
they accorded greater deference to sovereign decisions on protecting health.
This alternative vision of external policy coherency is not, however,
realistic or feasible. My argument relies less on a detailed reading of the
existing WTO rules than on an emphasis of the importance of trade to
international relations, especially in the post-Cold War era.
Health as foreign policy is a relatively new phenomenon. Trade as
foreign policy is as old as international relations itself. The interests of
States in being able to trade robustly are pervasive. Globalization grooves
these interests more deeply with each passing year. Contemporary
economic growth and development strategies depend on the engine of trade.
Trade could even be considered a geopolitical determinant of health that
requires the support and backing of public health as a matter of foreign
policy. A weak or failing international trading system would produce
political and economic consequences under which national and global
health, especially of the most vulnerable populations, would suffer. Public
health needs a stable, orderly, and dynamic international trading system
because this system delivers economic opportunities and resources that are
critical for improving standards of living and funding public services. This
reality applies to developed and developing countries and thus is not
confined to contexts of development.
Given the enormous geopolitical importance of trade, and its foreign
policy significance to every country, the international trade law in the
WTO on goods and services actually accommodates health well, especially
considering the fact that health officials and experts were not significantly
involved in the negotiations of the WTO agreements. The appearance time
and again of the same template for balancing trade and health with respect
to trade in goods in international trade law and international law on public
health also suggests that the competing interests of States have found
equilibrium that works. The template's appearance again in the IHR 2005
reinforces its systemic stability.
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2. External Policy Coherency and Trade in Services. - For services,
the template is currently whatever the WTO Member in question wants the
balance between trade in services and the protection of health to be.
Proposals made in advance of, and during, the WTO ministerial meeting in
Hong Kong in December 2005 would, if adopted, have significantly
changed the status quo. Under proposals made before the Hong Kong
ministerial meeting, WTO Members would have to make mandatory,
numerically based liberalization commitments across service sectors. Many
WTO Members opposed these numerical targets for the services
negotiations. In November 2005, the Chairman of the Council for Trade in
Services reported:
A number of Members stated that numerical targets would help
to translate a high level of ambition into meaningful
commitments for services in the round. Several Members
indicated that inclusion of numerical targets in the text of the
Ministerial Declaration would be necessary. Many Members
expressed strong reservations about numerical targets,
particularly in terms of their compatibility with the GATS and
the Negotiating Guidelines, and considered that these proposals
were no longer a basis for discussion. Given that the gap
between positions remains too wide to be bridged, I have not
included a reference to numerical targets in the draft text [for
the Hong Kong ministerial meeting]. 57
Disputes about moving negotiations on liberalization of trade in
services from the bilateral request-offer format into a plurilateral requestoffer mechanism also caused problems in pre-Hong Kong discussions in
the Council on Trade in Services. Plurilateral requests would involve WTO
Members making offers or requests to a number of other WTO Members
simultaneously with the view to collective negotiations the results of which
would be made available to all WTO Members on a most-favored-nation
basis. The Chairman of the Council on Trade in Services reported in
November 2005 that "regarding negotiations on a plurilateral basis, a
number of delegations felt that the text could have been phrased in a more
binding manner. Other Members took the opposite view that certain of its
elements were overly prescriptive." 5 Despite the disagreement about
plurilateral negotiations, the draft text for the Hong Kong ministerial

"Council for Trade in Services, Special Session of the Councilfor Trade in Services: Report by
the Chairman to the Trade NegotiationsCommittee, 9, TN/S/23 (Nov. 28, 2005).
' I1d. 13.
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that required WTO Members engage in the
meeting included language
59
plurilateral process.
At Hong Kong, WTO Members did not include numerical targets in the
services annex of the Ministerial Declaration but did include the nonbinding option for WTO Members to engage in plurilateral negotiations on
liberalization of trade in services. 60 How the plurilateral negotiations will
unfold and evolve remains, as of this writing, to be seen. The addition of a
non-binding plurilateral negotiating process does not, technically, change
the discretion GATS accords to WTO Members to decide how they wish to
liberalize their service sectors. The external policy coherency achieved by
GATS remains in place, but the attempt by some WTO Members to change
the process through which liberalization of trade in services occurs by
adding mandatory numerical targets and an obligation to engage in
plurilateral negotiations demonstrates that this coherency is vulnerable and
must be carefully watched, particularly by those in the health policy
community.
3. External Policy Coherency and Intellectual Property Rights. - In
the context of external policy coherency, intellectual property rights remain
a serious problem. State interests on protecting patents and protecting
health have not settled into equilibrium and continue to conflict, causing
tension within and beyond the WTO. Evidence of divergence in State
interests on patent rights on pharmaceuticals and the TRIPS flexibilities
and safeguards can be in found in the controversies leading to the Doha
Declaration and the disagreements after the Doha Declaration, including
the contentious negotiations on the Decision on the Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. 6' More evidence of the lack of
external policy coherency on patent rights and health can be located in the
controversies generated by the United States' pursuit of "TRIPS-plus"
provisions in bilateral and regional trade agreements. 62 These provisions
grant holders of intellectual property rights, especially patents, more
protection than TRIPS; and critics see the U.S. push for TRIPS-plus
provisions as its strategy to circumvent the health-patents balance achieved
in multilateral WTO process through and after the Doha Declaration.
The regional and bilateral agreements that contain TRIPS-plus
provisions have a potential multilateral impact because of the most'9Id. 7(b).
6oWorld Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, Annex C,

7,

WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005),.

61 World Trade Organization, Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on

the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Cor. I (Sept.

1, 2003), at

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
62 For a critical analysis of TRIPS-plus provisions, see Oxfam, TRIPS-Plus Provisions, at
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/issues-we-work-on/trade/news_publications/tripsart539
Shtml.
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favored-nation (MFN) principle in TRIPS. Any WTO Member that grants
the United States TRIPS-plus protections in a bilateral or regional trade
agreement must grant that advantage, favor, and privilege immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all WTO Members. 63 As the web of
agreements containing TRIPS-plus provisions grows, the MFN principle in
TRIPS potentially establishes a new de facto multilateral level of patent
protection not reflected in TRIPS itself. TRIPS-plus politics are, thus,
rightly a serious issue to those who are concerned about calibrating trade
and health interests with respect to intellectual property rights.
E. InternalPolicy Coherency: Synergy in Service of the National
Interest
The second level of policy coherence in the context of trade and health
is internal. Analysis of external policy coherence proceeded on the basis
that States had national interests in trade and health that they managed in
their relations with each other largely through multilateral international
legal instruments, including the WTO agreements. External policy
coherency develops in a symmetrical context: Country G's trade interest
bumps up against Country H's health interest, producing a need for
equilibrium between the two national interests. Internal policy coherence
focuses, instead, on how a country constructs its national interest
domestically with respect to trade and health.
The objective of internal policy coherence goes beyond balancing
interests in trade and health. The balancing task identified with external
policy coherency flows from the interaction of States in a condition of
anarchy. Internal policy coherence has the advantage of operating in a
hierarchical governance context of domestic politics, which offers
prospects for policy coherence to aim for synergy. Domestic actions should
be synergistic in the sense of having trade and health interests make
different contributions to the same end. Synergistic actions converge in
ways that advance the identified end farther than action alone in one area
could achieve.
One way to illustrate the synergy at the heart of internal policy
coherence is to consider an alternative approach to trade and health issues.
Think, for example, of the traditional "wealth produces health" trope.
Under this framework, health is not a participant in the construction of the
national interest but a by-product of the foreign policy process. Economic
considerations alone determine the national interest the State uses in its
dealing with other countries through trade. The health-benefits created by
the economics-only focus are positive externalities the State and its people
63 TRIPS

art. 4.

20061

CALIBRATING WEALTH

& HEALTH

AFTER

WTO's FIRST DECADE

enjoy when trade produces them. This example describes internal policy
monopoly by trade rather than coherency between trade and health.
The balancing of trade and health externally through international legal
rules creates the need for those involved in foreign, trade, and health
policies within the State to contribute to the formulation of the national
interest. The WHO Executive Board considered, for example, the view that
WHO Members face "the need to promote a constructive dialogue at
national level and to base policies on sound evidence, so that countries
could maximize the positive effects of trade and minimize its negative
impact." 64 This perspective echoes the relationship of partnership described
by Lee and McInnes as "one in which the tools and skills of various policy
communities - development, security, public health and foreign policy are brought together for the greater good. 6 5 How States integrate trade and
health objectives and concerns in constructing their respective national
interests is the subject matter of internal policy coherence.
In many ways, internal coherence is a more difficult challenge than
external coherence. Even when health ministers and experts have not
participated in trade negotiations, international trade agreements produced,
by and large, a balance for trade in goods and services that leaves room for
States to craft policies and approaches in which the health and trade sectors
jointly participate in formulating the national interest. However, such joint
participation has not occurred, and still often does not occur, within many
countries.
The tendency within States historically has been to marginalize health
ministries and experts through a double dose of "stove piping." First,
governments often organized their thinking according to the "domestic
policy" and the "foreign policy." Health generally fell under the domestic
policy category. Second, even within the domestic policy, health often
operated in ways disconnected from other policy areas that affected health
inputs and outcomes. This double stove-piping meant that health ministries
and experts often had more contact with their counterparts in other
countries through transgovernmental networks than their own trade and
foreign ministries.
Largely through these transgovernmental networks, health ministries
and experts began to deliberate on the extent to which the policy space for
health within countries was affected by the acceleration of globalization,
aided by the evolution of the multilateral trading system in the form of the
WTO. Health problems respected no policy stove pipes, but stove pipes
6WHO Executive Board, International Trade and Health: Draft Resolution - Report by the
Secretariat, 2, WHO Doc. EB 117/10 (Dec. 1, 2005).
63Kelley Lee & Colin Mclnnes, A Conceptual Frameworkfor Research and Policy, in HEALTH,
FOREIGN POLICY & SECURITY: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND

POLICY 16 (A. Ingram, ed., 2004).
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still structured responses within countries. Integrated threats were met with
disaggregated governance. Internal policy coherency on trade and health
suffered.
These dynamics demonstrate that internal policy coherence between
trade and health in WTO agreements is not organic but has to be
deliberately constructed, nurtured, and maintained. Left to their own
devices and natural inclinations, trade and health communities would tend
to drift back into patterns with which they are more comfortable. These
tendencies and historical patterns underscore why internal policy coherency
has to be achieved through government and governance architecture and
capabilities that maximize the ability of health and trade ministries to
contribute to the formulation of a national interest that simultaneously
advances health and trade objectives with the framework of the WTO
agreements.
F. Towards Trade Epidemiology
Identifying the need for internal policy coherency and describing its
general nature are easier, of course, than producing such coherency. The
organizational diversity of governments makes concrete descriptions of
needed mechanisms and institutions less helpful for the purposes of this
article than providing a general approach for achieving internal policy
coherency. I call this approach trade epidemiology. The basic idea is to
mainstream the use of public health principles and techniques, where
relevant, in the formulation and implementation of trade policy. The goal is
to have health and trade policy converging synergistically in the
construction of a more enlightened national interest. Internal policy
coherence will not work well if the relationship between trade and health
mainly constitutes health officials complaining about trade and the WTO
and not offering constructive solutions to make trade and health work
together more productively for the good of the country within and outside
the WTO.
The trade epidemiology approach might include (but not be limited to)
the following kinds of activities:
Building the evidence base for policy: Having more accurate
and comprehensive empirical evidence of the ways trade
affects public health would enhance efforts to achieve
internal policy coherency. The need for better empirical data
has been particularly acute with respect to the international
trade in health-related services.66 This effort could involve

66

Richard Smith, Chantal Blouin & Nick Drager, Trade in Health Services and the GATS:

Introduction and Summary, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES AND THE GATS:
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developing a system that organizes and analyzes notifications
issued under international agreements related to public health
(e.g., SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement) and other forms of
information (e.g., ProMed-mail, WHO's Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network) to increase the transparency
and quality of data concerning trade and health.67
" Monitoring implementation of existing agreements related to
trade and health: Trade and health ministries should develop
harmonized approaches to monitoring how existing
agreements that affect trade and health are being
implemented by governments and what weaknesses and
problems need to be addressed. The WHO Executive Board
recommended that the World Health Assembly urge WHO
Members "to continue to develop capacity at national level to
track and analyse the potential opportunities and challenges
of trade and trade agreements for health-sector performance
and health outcomes[.],, 68 This task becomes more important
and complex as the number of trade agreements a country
adopts increases.
" Integration of public health expertise in negotiations of new
agreements and arrangements: States periodically negotiate
new agreements and arrangements that affect trade and health,
and health input and/or expertise should be integrated into all
diplomatic teams that negotiate these regimes. Accountable
and transparent processes should be developed for resolving
conflicts between trade and health interests with respect to
proposed new agreements or arrangements to ensure that
health concerns are not automatically subordinated to trade
objectives. These observations recall the WHO Executive
Board's recommendation that the World Health Assembly
urge WHO Members "to apply, or establish, where necessary,
coordination mechanisms involving ministries of finance,
health, and trade, and other relevant institutions, to' 69address
public health related aspects of international trade[.]
"Networking trade epidemiology: Efforts to improve synergies
between trade and health domestically can be aided by
CURRENT ISSUES AND DEBATES, supra note 48, at 13 ("Data on the impact of trade liberalization
on health, health services, or the economy are scarce.").
67 See Ann Marie Kimball, The Health of Nations: Happy Birthday WTO, THE LANCET ONLINE,
Dec. 15, 2005 (arguing that "[tlhere is, at present, no mechanism for systematically referring
(WTO] notifications [under the SPS and TBT Agreements] to WHO, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, or the Codex Alimentarius").
6s WHO Executive Board, supra note 1i,
1(5).
69Id.

1(3).
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linking such internal activities with intergovernmental
regimes (WTO, WHO) and existing transgovernmental
networks. The creation of a working group on trade and
health at the WTO might provide a catalyst for broadening
domestic attempts to integrate trade and health
and deepening
70
policies.
Trade for health initiatives: Trade epidemiology should
integrate systematic efforts to stimulate and undertake trade
initiatives that could positively benefit health. Such "trade for
health" initiatives could include promoting exports of old or
new health-related products or technologies; proposals to cut
or eliminate tariff rates on important health products and
supporting
technologies to increase affordable access;
international standardization efforts that make products safer
and more healthy; providing technical and financial
assistance to help developing countries implement healthprotecting international standards; awarding prizes to
companies that increase access to health-related products and
technologies for developing countries; encouraging licensing
arrangements to allow foreign manufacture of health-related
technologies to better serve poor populations; fostering
public-private partnerships that utilize trade to improve
health; and creating preferential trading privileges for
countries that achieve material progress toward achieving the
health-related MDGs.
Trade epidemiology as an approach to internal policy coherency would
require institutional change within trade, health, and foreign policy
bureaucracies and the development of novel kinds of personnel and
information capabilities. Trade epidemiology would depart from what has
prevailed in the past, but internal policy coherency's objective of synergy
for trade and health cannot be achieved by half-hearted half-measures.

70 See

David P. Fidler, Draft of a L20 Communiqui on Global Health, Oct. 31, 2004, at 3, available

at http://www.120.org/publications/Phase%20II/Health/healthfidlercommunique.pdf (proposing
a Working Group on Trade and Global Health); and Kimball, supra note 67(calling for a WTO
Committee on Health).
71See Fidler, supra note 70, at 4 (arguing in October 2004 that "[ejfforts to reduce tariffs and other
trade barriers that adversely affect access to life-saving and health-promoting products . . . indicate
that systematically identifying and reducing such barriers could produce global health benefits.").
In February 2006, the United States and Switzerland jointly introduced a proposal at the WTO that
would eliminate tariffs on the trade in medicines and medical devices. See United States Trade
Representative, United States Seeks to EliminateGlobal Tariffs on Medicines and Medical Devices,
Feb. 27, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/PressReleases/2006/February
/UnitedStatesSeekstoEliminateGlobalTariffs onMedicinesMedical Devices.html.
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V. OBSTACLES TO POLICY COHERENCE BETWEEN TRADE AND
HEALTH

Achieving policy coherence in the relationship between trade and
health in the early 21st century confronts many problems that threaten to
drain this project of energy and potential. These threats are, therefore,
important to understand with respect to the trade and health relationship for
the WTO's next ten years. At the most general level, trade and health
coherency may not get high-level political attention and commitment
compared to other areas of foreign policy that also demand more coherency
in policy making and implementation. The challenge of creating unity of
purpose through a diversity of means in the context of networked anarchy
forces governments to prioritize their coherency needs in their overall
foreign policies.
A. The Policy Triage Problem
Leaving aside the larger foreign policy context, trade and health policy
coherency with respect to the WTO may not even rank highly on the
agenda of health as foreign policy. Countries face many serious national
and global health problems that have urgency not present in the trade and
health relationship within the WTO. For example, the perceived threat of
pandemic influenza, which is linked to the global spread of avian influenza
(H5NI), is increasingly driving the health as foreign policy agenda. This
threat highlights the world's lack of public health preparedness and the
inadequacies of national and international surveillance and response
capabilities for both animal and human health.
The avian influenza crisis certainly affects trade (e.g., imposition of
bans on the importation of poultry and poultry products from affected
countries), but this communicable disease crisis does not point to obvious
external or internal policy coherency problems between trade and health as
something requiring urgent attention in the WTO. Similarly, other major
global health problems, including the still worsening HIV/AIDS pandemic,
the lack of progress on achieving the health-related MDGs, and the need to
help developing countries build the core surveillance and response
capacities mandated by the IHR 2005, all require actions, such as
significantly increased international development assistance, that do not
hinge on health's relationship with trade in the WTO.
Given that health ministries in most countries face an increasing parade
of public health problems that require, on epidemiological grounds,
immediate action, the need for policy triage might marginalize the tradehealth coherency agenda or outsourcing it to NGOs. Under-resourced and
under-staffed public health authorities may not be able to focus on the trade
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and health coherence objective. This problem may be most acute in
developing and least-developed countries where such coherency is, in fact,
most needed.
The pressures of policy triage may also exist in the realm of trade.
Although the Hong Kong ministerial meeting did not collapse in failure,
the WTO's Doha Development Agenda remains in trouble. WTO watchers
worry about the lack of progress made to date in the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. Incoherency between trade and health
stimulated by WTO agreements is not a cause of the Doha Round's travails,
nor is it perceived as a major problem presently confronting the WTO's
efforts on the Doha Round. Experts are more concerned about the lack of
progress in the negotiations on the liberalization of trade in agriculture, the
trend of WTO Members adopting regional and bilateral trade agreements,
and the lack of progress on, among other things, special and preferential
treatment for developing and least-developed countries.
B. Challengesfor ExternalPolicy Coherence
The lack of urgency concerning trade and health policy coherence in
the worlds of foreign policy, health, and trade also connects with issues
arising under external policy coherence. As argued earlier, the balance
struck between trade and health interests in WTO rules on goods is such
that WTO Members have expressed no serious interest in changing them.
In terms of services, the addition of plurilateral negotiations for
liberalization of trade in services has the potential to stress external policy
coherency achieved in GATS. Divergence of trade and health interests is
most apparent with respect to patent rights; but, after the Doha Declaration
and the agreement on implementation of its paragraph 6, the patent rights
controversy has shifted to the context of regional and bilateral trade
agreements and TRIPS-plus provisions in such agreements. Given the
nature of the divergent State interests on intellectual property rights in the
WTO system, the prospects for better external policy coherence on this
aspect of the trade-health relationship are not currently promising.
The increasing adoption of regional and bilateral trade agreements
complicates external and internal policy coherence in ways beyond the
issue of intellectual property rights. The proliferation of these agreements
increases the transactions costs for achieving and sustaining external and
internal policy coherence. Operating under a single, universally accepted
set of rules creates efficiencies for policy efforts geared to monitoring the
relationship between trade and health. If trade epidemiology has to manage
an increasingly complex set of agreements that does not embody the same
rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, then the effort is more
time consuming, expensive, and less transparent. Such increased
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transaction costs would burden developing and least-developed countries
more than developed countries.
The trend toward regional and bilateral trade agreements may also
create different substantive balances between trade and health than those
struck in WTO agreements. Some regional and bilateral agreements have
provisions that are more aggressive on trade in services than GATS and
rules that go beyond the intellectual property protections accorded by
TRIPS - the "TRIPS-plus" provisions. In such circumstances, external
policy coherence, defined as a balance between trade and health interests of
States, becomes a series of fragmented and unconnected balances that
prevail between different countries.
This situation does not undermine the utility of thinking about external
policy coherency, but it complicates assessment of the balance required for
external policy coherency to exist. In addition, the more the rules on goods,
services, and intellectual property rights differ from the WTO rules, the
more likely it is that State interests are diverging in terms of trade interests
vis-A-vis health interests. Divergence in State interests on a broader basis
may erode the balance represented in WTO agreements that currently
produces the external policy coherence that does exist.
C. Challengesfor Internal Policy Coherency
In terms of obstacles for internal policy coherence, defined as synergy
between trade and health in service of the national interest, many arise from
the historical absence of close interagency cooperation between trade and
health and the lack of resources health ministries and authorities suffer,
particularly in developing and least-developed countries. Given their
pressing priorities, trade ministries may not respond with enthusiasm to an
agenda that potentially alters how trade policy is made.
With health over-stretched and trade wary, producing synergy between
trade and health internally in response to fulfilling obligations under WTO
agreements may prove difficult practically and bureaucratically. These
dynamics suggest a need for higher-level political intervention before
prospects for synergy in the service of the national interest may seem
credible. The likelihood of such intervention probably varies from State to
State, but this type of intervention may only occur with respect to the most
urgent issues or crises and not for the operation of trade epidemiology.
Internal as well as external coherency challenges may also arise from
the growing challenges to global health presented by non-communicable
diseases. WHO and other public health experts have warned that morbidity
and mortality from non-communicable diseases are increasing globally.
This increase is epidemiologically related to the consumption of products
traded internationally (e.g., tobacco products, processed foods, alcoholic
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beverages). Achieving external and internal policy coherency with respect
to products associated with non-communicable diseases may be
increasingly difficult. The main WTO cases concerning human health
adjudicated by the Dispute Settlement Body to date have involved alleged
threats of non-communicable diseases. 72 This reality suggests that the
relationship between trade and non-communicable diseases raises policy
dissonance issues not created by trade-related issues generated by
communicable diseases. Controversies about the potential impact of
WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control73 on the obligations of
WTO Members serve as further evidence that increasing national and
international public health efforts on non-communicable diseases may
create friction with internal and external incentives to export products
associated with the burden of non-communicable disease. Such friction
spells trouble for policy coherence on trade and health at all levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether sustained policy coherence for trade and health in the
operation of the WTO agreements can be achieved has become a
significant question, particularly for those working on health problems
around the world. As this article argued, this question is connected to much
larger policy coherency projects that address reinventing foreign policy for
the new age of globalized problems. The larger foreign policy perspective
allows us to see how health itself has risen as a foreign policy consideration
in the last decade, but the rise of health to greater foreign policy
prominence does not ensure that achieving policy coherence between trade
and health within the WTO becomes a much easier task.
When viewed as a coherency challenge in foreign policy, trade and
health policy coherence actually involves two challenges in the form of
external and internal policy coherence. The article argued that, of these two,
internal policy coherence has proved the most difficult to achieve; and
trade epidemiology was offered as a framework for organizing trade and
health in such a way that the State's national interest reflects synergy rather
than competition between'these two areas of political endeavor. The
obstacles to external and internal policy coherence for trade and health are,
however, formidable, not least because foreign policy, trade, and health all
must engage in policy triage that may show that trade and health coherency

72US - Gasoline, supra note 6 (dispute over clean air standards); EC - Hormones, supra note 7

(dispute over use of hormones alleged to be carcinogenic: and EC - Asbestos, supra note 8 (dispute
over measures banning products containing asbestos, a known carcinogen).
" WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, WHO Doc. WHA56.1,
Annex, available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA56/ea56rl .pdf.
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is not the most pressing concern for States even within the realm of health
as foreign policy.
Achieving coherence between trade and health has become increasingly
desirable, but responding to this necessity is more complicated and difficult
than might at first be imagined. This task requires the State to establish
unity of purpose on trade and health and use a diversity of means to steer
the national interest through the complex reality of globalization, including
the WTO agreements. Replicated across the international system, this
approach could produce results that foster human betterment. Sustained
achievement of such policy coherency would demonstrate that the
anarchical society of States cooperating through the WTO is capable of
improving its ability to calibrate the wealth and health of nations.

